ingless until some artifact of human culture be employed to render it meaningful. Olson, however, claims that "the history passed down to us is not a body of facts like Eliade thinks" (360) . Yet the whole of my chapter 9 argues that in Eliade's work we find a complex understanding of history as something other than a "body of facts." Failing to consider the complexity of history for Eliade, Olson has already refused that which is postmodern about him. Accepting this complexity, the similarities between Eliade's and Foucault's attitudes to history (even as described by Olson) is immediately apparent.
Olson similarly neglects my analysis of Eliade's equation of the sacred and the real (chapter 2 in Reconstructing Eliade). Although he recognizes that "Eliade is convinced that when a religious object comes into being it also becomes real" (363), Olson ignores the dialectic of the sacred and the profane in which religious objects do not "come into being" ex nihilo, but by the transformation of the apprehension of the perceiver. Again, to argue that Eliade continues "to hold out the possibility of finding absolutes because all knowledge is not as relative as Foucault claims" (363) to Eliade" (368). Olson realizes that Being is related to reality in Eliade's works but he assumes that this implies that "Being is not a human construct for Eliade" (368). This ignores the Kantian identification of reality as a category of the understanding, which I take to be fundamental to Eliade's work. "Reality" is a human construct insofar as the attribution of reality can be made or withheld relative to cultural conditioning (Reconstructing Eliade, 22 ). This does not mean, however, that I make Eliade into a skeptic, as Olson insists (371 ), but that I make him into a species of relativist as I explicitly state in the book: "Eliade manifests the primary characteristics of the relativist in seeing alternative worldviews as each true" (127).
Olson sees Derrida as convinced of "the total relativity of meaning" but insists that Eliade cannot share this conviction "because he cannot imagine how it is possible for human beings to function without an assurance that there is something irreducibly real and mean- Derrida in many particulars.' Where Derrida identifies a longing for a center, Eliade has his symbolism of the center, the desire to live in close proximity to the sacred. Where this leads Derrida to his critique of binary opposition, Eliade analyses the coincidentia oppositorum. Derrida considers the longing for the center to spawn a "centering" or privileging of one of the binary pair and to give rise to the play of
